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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on agricultural insurance seems to provide very few succesful examples (Valdés 
& Pomareda, ; Hueth et al. ). Yet most conclusions are based on a very limited number of 
experiences and countries, which mostly focus on publicly provided insurance. Many world 
countries, developed and developing, have agricultural insurance systems or have gone through 
processes of development, crises, and revitalisation. The European Union is considering shifting 
part of their income support mechanisms towards safety nets and risk management instruments, 
including agricultural insurance (EU Commission, ). 
 Conventional wisdom assumes that agricultural insurance is too vulnerable to serious 
problems of asymetric information (Just & Pope, 2002; Chambers, 1989). In the European 
Union, the private sector provides basic coverages for a very limited number of hazards, 
indicating that many of the risks and hazards to which farmers are exposed cannot be insured by 
private insurance companies.  Some EU countries, including Spain, Greece and Italy have 
developed comprehensive insurance policies as a means to provide safety nets for farmers. In 
the last ten years, the US, Spain, and Canada, among others, have expanded their insurance 
systems in terms of insured risks, kinds of policies, and their budgetary allocations to subsidise 
premia. 
 Despite its importance in terms of insured acreage, total liabilities and premium 
subsidies, very little is known about non-US insurance experiences, with the exception of 
Canada. Most policy reviews provide very superficial treatment to other experiences (OECD, 
2002; EC commission, 2000). The Spanish case is especially striking because it has a rich 
experience in developing new and innovative agricultural insurance, and has been expanding 
during the last 25 years. And yet it has received scant attention in the literature, and completely 
ignored as an alternative model to countries in the process of developing their own systems.  
 This paper focuses on the demand for agricultural insurance in Spain. It seeks to 
characterise the demand for insurance in Spain and determine the main factors explaining 
farmers’ participation in insurance. The novelty of the approach is that it uses farmers’ actual 
insurance outcomes as the main explanatory factors for insurance participation. Another 
breakthrough of our analysis is the variety of crops, insurance policies and farming conditions 
included in the sample, which is formed by more than 52,000 farmers and 12 years of insurance 
records. 
 The paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the literature on insurance demand in 
section 2, we provide a brief description of the Spanish agricultural insurance system and 
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primary factual data in the third section. Section 4 includes the basic model for insurance 
demand. In section 5 we provide numerical results that enrich the theoretical conclusions. 
Section 6 describes the database used in the statistical and econometric analyses, whose results 
are discussed in section 7. The paper’s most salient conclusions are summarised in section 8. 
 
2. Insurance demand 
 
Canada, Spain and the US are among the OECD countries with more developed agricultural 
insurance policies. The three of them have in the last decade increased the budget devoted to 
premium subsidisation, and the pecentages of farmers and surface with some coverage. As 
rough measures, these countries spend in subsidising insurance policies an equivalent of 1 to 2% 
of their total agricultural output. In response to these significant budget allocation, about 50 to 
60% of the eligible farmers purchase at least one insurance policy. On average, US spends in 
insurance subsidies about US$25 per insured hectare, Spain €25, and Canada C$50.   
 Insurance subsidisation, though important in absolute and relative terms, is not the only 
means the governments of these countries support agricultural insurance. Agencies directly or 
indirectly promote research and support continuous innovation, offering a broad menu of 
insurance options to field crops, fruits and vegetables and livestock farmers. On the demand 
side, farmers respond changing the crops they insure, the type of policy or the coverage. In 
Spain, some insurance policies are purchased by 100% of the eligible farmers (banana or tomato 
in the Canary Islands) and some others by less than 5%, including olive trees or revenue 
insurance for potato.   
 Farmers purchase insurance polices because (1) expected benefits are positive, (2) they 
gain from asymmetric information, and (3) they are risk-averse (Just et al. 2003). The bulk of 
the literature on agricultural insurance has focused on items (1) and (2), that have been tested 
under alternative assumptions about item (3).  
 With insurance, asymetric information implies that insuree and insurer have different 
information about productive risks and insuree’s behaviour. Asymetric information is thought to 
provide incentives for moral hazard and adverse selection.  Quiggin et al. (1993) contend that 
very often it is not possible to empirically distinguish between moral hazard and adverse 
selection, however different may be in theoretical terms. Consider the case of a farmer that 
defers his planting to learn more about soil-moisture and see whether it is in his interest to 
purchase drought insurance. This type of behaviour is illustrative of both moral hazard and 
adverse selection. It exhibits adverse selection because insurance is purchased only if a lower 
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yield is expected. It is moral hazard because the decision to defer planting is influenced by the 
existence of yield insurance. Moschini and Hennessy (2001) review in detail the problems 
related to asymetric information. What this wealth of literature, entirely based on US cases and 
data, seems to suggest is that there is disagreement about whether or not asymetric information 
pose incentives to increase production.  
 
 Wright and Hewitt (1990, cited by  Moschini and Hennessy, 2001) contend that actual 
demand for insurance would be lower than is generally believed, because farmers have many 
other cheaper means to control and reduce their risks. In general, insurance is thought to be an 
expensive instruments, because policies have to be designed in order to reduce the negative 
effects of asymetric information. As a result, in the absence of subsidies insurance would not be 
attractive to most farmers.  Ramaswami (1993) divide up insurance effects in two: moral hazard 
effects and risk reduction effects. The first encourages reductions of input use and by the second 
the insuree would seek greater expected revenue. However, there is some ambiguity with 
regards to moral hazard effects, because increase-production inputs can be also risk-augmenting. 
In general, it is thought that fertilisers are risk-augment inputs, and pesticides risk-reduction 
inputs.  However, insurance policies include a number of provision and features that are meant 
to reduce or eliminate moral hazard, but adding little room for risk reduction effects.  While 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) found no evidence of moral hazard among  US maize 
growers, and Wu (1999) four very weak evidence among  US maize growers, the list of those 
that found includes Quiggin et al. (1993) with US grain producers, Smith and Goodwin (1996) 
with wheat producers, Babcock and Hennessy (1996) with simulation models, Coble et al. 
(1996) with  Kansas farms, Serra et al. (2005) with Kansas growers and Mishra et al. with  
wheat US producers. None of these studies use more than 1,600 farms, or look at other crops. 
 
 Combating adverse selection is paramount to being able to offer specific insurance 
policies to relatively homogenous groups of farmers. For this, insurers must count on 
objectively discriminatory elements to group of agents under homogenous risk levels, and 
charge different premia. While the confirmation of moral hazard would lead to the conclusion 
that insurance is a decoupled policy, the presence of adverse selection needs not be so. What 
adverse selection indicates is the absence of discrimination elements and the unbalance of 
premia and indemnities. If adverse-selection provides strong incentives to cultivate marginal 
land, then insurance may increase production and for that matter should not qualify as a 
decoupled policy. Yet, as Moschini and Hennessy (2001) indicate the Canadian Prairie Farm 
Assistance Act (1939) was conceived to grant revenue instability of farmers located in territories 
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to which they should have never been pushed to occupy. While this may be true in many other 
countries and regions, the passage of time since land was converted to agriculture precludes 
qualifying these historical processes as adverse-selection.  This, despite the fact premium must 
be heavily subsidised to maintain farmers’ interest. Another important factor related to adverse 
selection is the fact that the required groups’ homogeniety to avoid adverse selection depends on 
farmers’ risk aversion. The more risk-averse, the less reluctant they will be to pay premium 
above their individual actuarial fair premium. Evidence of adverse selection was found by Skees 
and Read (1986) with soybean and maize US growers, Goodwin (1994) among Kansas farms, 
Quiggin et al. (1993), Just et al (1999) with US growers, Ker & McGowan (2000) among 
insurance firms in the casse of wheat producers in Texas, and by Makki & Somwaru (2001) with 
corn producers from Iowa, using the largest data set (6,000 farms) among those reviewed here.  
  The evidence in favour of severe asymetric information problems is dubious and mostly 
based on a limited number of US insurance policies (MCPI and APH), although Makki & 
Somwaru find strong evidence for adverse selection in presence of four types of policies 
including revenue insurance,.. The literature seems to suggest that farmers seem to be compelled 
to purchase insurance attracted by the expected results, which are also dependent on the level of 
insurance attached to the premium (Just et al. 1999). Makki & Somwaru (2001) show high risk 
US farmers are more likely to purchase revenue insurance and higher coverage levels, and that 
low-risk farmers tend to be overcharged. 
 A controversial issue about the role of subsidies in the demand for insurance still 
revolves and has not been settled in the literature. Goodwin (2001)  finds demand elasticity for 
insurance is between -0.24 and -0.20. (Serra, Goodwin and Featherstone 2003, p. 109) show that 
it has be become less elastic in the US as farmers have turned to larger coverages, favoured by 
ARPA (2002) increased subsidisation. 
 None of these studies use actual insurance outcomes, such as individual loss ratios, 
indemnities or expected returns from insuance, to explain farmers’ insurance decisions. Even 
Makki & Somwaru (2001), who use the largest and most insurance-diverse data set, evaluate 
measures of expected indemnity for Iowa corn growers and include in their polytomous logit 
model. Just et al. (1999) rely on the comparison between stated yields percentiles and insurance 
premium, but do not include actual indemnities. Among the major drawbacks of the previous 
work is the fact that not all cases crop failures or low yields are indemnifiable. So in order to 
evaluate the demand of insurance, one has to include in the analysis what farmers actually get or 
would be reasonable to expect from their premia and compare it with the cost. 
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 3. The Agricultural Insurance system in Spain 
 
Agricultural insurance in Spain dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, but remained 
fairly unimportant and underwent various waves of decline and resurgence until 1978. This year 
saw the passing of the Agricultural Insurance Act which set the stage for a continuous growth of 
agricultural insurance in Spain. The Spanish system is based on a mixed public-private model, 
in which farmers’ unions and association do also play a crucial role. Interested readers can learn 
a complete description of the Spanish insurance system in OECD and EU reports (OECD, 2001 
& European Commission, 2000). In Figure 1, we plot the total liability of agricultural 
production, including livestock production, and the ratios of total expenditures in premium 
subsidisation over total liability. The graph shows the steady growth of the agricultural 
insurance, which now reaches about 30 to 40% of all eligible production. Farmers in Spain can 
choose among more than 200 different policies, that provide coverages to all possible crops and 
animal production. The system has evolved in the last 20 years to offer a wide menu of products 
to a wider range of crops and animal production. Premium are subsidised by the Spanish and 
Regional goverments in a percentage that range from 20 to 45% of the market premium.  In the 
period 1980-2004, loss ratios for all policies, experimental policies and viable policies, were 
respectively, 99.56%, 114.31% and 82.98% (Agroseguro, 2004), indicating that the system has 
grown following sound actuarial criteria.  
 While Spain has followed a traditional approach to define insurable risks and establish 
loss adjustment procedures, fitting with the model of Multiple-peril Crop Insurance. In the last 
years, the system has evolved to provide yield insurance, based on individual or zonal records, 
for many crops including cereal and winter crops, olive trees and a number of other fruit crops. 
Two kinds on index insurance have been used experimentally with different success. The failed 
attempt came with a potatoe revenue insurance, based on a price index, offered in seasons 2003 
and 2004, which very few farmers purchased. The more succesful example is ‘drought’ 
insurance available to range livestock growers, which is based on a vegetation index produced 
by from satelite images.  
4. Data sources and documentation 
 
The statistical and econometric analyses use data from the Spanish agricultural insurance system 
(ENESA). Our database includes records from individual farm from 7 agricultural diverse 
comarcas (equivalent to US counties). The complete database includes all 52,300 farmers that 
purchased insurance at least in two years between the period 1993-2004, and a complete 
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characterisation of each farm’s insurance strategy, paid premiums, premium subsidies, and 
collected indemnities. Table 1 summarises the main descriptive elements of each comarca. The 
database includes a diverse set of crop risks, natural conditions and kinds of insurance policies. 
For cereals, farmers can choose among three coverage levels, ranging from basic coverage 
including hailstorm and fire risks to individual yield risks. Fruit growers can choose among two 
coverage levels. From each farmer and year, records include the following variables: (1) If 
purchased any insurance (binary); (2) Crops insured, including surface (ha), expected yield 
(kg/ha), total liability (€), paid premium (€), premium subsidies (€), and the kind of coverage; 
(3) Indemnities (€) received by crop, coverage and year. In Table 1 we report the counts of 
dichotomous variable Insur, which takes 1 if the farm purchased at least one insurance policy in 
the corresponding year, and 0 other wise. Since the database contains 12 years, the maximum 
count is 12.   Depending on the comarca, 50% of the farmers purchased at least one insurance 
policy between 4 and 6 years during 1993-2004.  
 Insurance demand analysis will be pursued along two different strategies, requiring the 
computation of different actuarial and behavioral variables. Using the data provided by the 
insurance records, we’ve generated a number of variables, that we first define and later on 
explain: 
Insurit -- binary (0,1) -- if buys any insurance policy in year t.  
Insurance00_03t -- categorical (0,4) -- number of years between 2000 and 2003 where Insur=1 
(valid only for t=2003). 
Exp_benit – numerical (≥0) –  a dimensionless measurement of the expected benefit resulting 
from purchasing insurance, computed with the following formula (i farmer, j comarca, k 
crop, t year): 
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where Indikt is the indemnity (€) and Pmiumikt is the premium paid (€), net of subsidies, 
for crop k and year t. Exp_ben provides an idea of the actual expected benefits in terms 
collected indemnities for one euro spent in purchasing insurance policies. 
Exp_ben_init– numerical (≥0) –  a dimensionless measurement of the inferred expected benefit 
resulting from purchasing insurance, computed with the following formula (i farmer, j 
comarca, k crop, t year): 
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Varijt– numerical (≥0) –  is a dimensionless measurement of the dispersion of the insurance 
payoffs, evaluated in relative terms, as follows: 
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Thirdijt– numerical (≤0) –  is a dimensionless measurement of the third moment of the insurance 
payoffs, evaluated in relative terms similarly to Varijt, except for the exponents of Dispikt 
and Dispkjt, which are 3 instead of 2.  
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 We now discuss the meaning of each of the above variables, with a few caveats in mind. 
First, our three variables are meant to provide a description of each farmer’s past individual 
insurance experience, using his individual records as the main sources of information. Second, 
only when the records of a farmer are sparce or limited, we add in the insurance variables of his 
comarca to complete the evaluation of the variables. For instance, in (4) if a farmer did not 
purchase insurance in a given year t-1, then Insurt-1=0 and his/her observation for Varijt is based 
on a weighted average of the comarca’s variance as evaluated by (6).  Third, because the three 
variables are based on past recorded data, they have more explanatory power for the last years of 
the series, which include a longer history. So no model insurance demand model will be tested 
for t<1999.  Fourth, the three variables are indices, that are meant to provide relative measures 
of the insurance returns of the farmer, irrespectively of his farm’s size, cropping patterns, 
profitability, crops’ risks or location. 
 The first variable, Exp_benit, is a typical loss ratio calculated individually along the 
insurance experience of the farmer.  If for any given year it is greater than 1, that means that the 
farmer collected more indemnities up to year t-1 than the total premium paid up to t-1. Note that 
premium subsidies significantly increase the loss ratios because the denominator is the sum of 
all premium, net of subsidies. Using the demand models, we will evaluate how the probabilities 
of the insurance participation variables may change with changes in the loss ratios  under 
alternative subsidies. Exp_benit may be 0 if the farmer did not received an indemnity at up to 
year t-1. If the farmer had not purchased any insurance premium before year t (with t>2000), 
then Exp_benit is missing and not used in the analysis.  
 The fact that  Exp_benit=0 does not imply that the expected benefit of purchasing 
insurance is zero. So as an alternative formulation, we use the inferred measurement of expected 
benefit,  Exp_ben_init, which is based on a weighted average of the comarca’s loss ratios of the 
crops he has purchased (formulated by expressions 2 and 3). Neither Exp_benit nor Exp_ben_init 
are perfect indicators of the expected returns of purchasing insurance, but our hypothesis is that 
they may be good enough to explain farmers’ insurance strategies. Figure 3 plots the histograms 
of Exp_ben and Exp_ben_in, both evaluated at the most recent year 2003, grouped by variable 
Insurance00_03. The differences of Exp_ben and Exp_ben_in are clearly associated with the 
subset of farmers that never received an indemnity. The histograms indicate that the proportion 
of  farmers whose Exp_ben>1 and Exp_ben_in>1  is larger for the frequent insurance buyers 
(Insurance00_03>3) and for those who did not purchase insurance in any of the 4 years 
(Insurance00_03=0).  
 Table 2 reports the statistics and percentiles of Exp_ben (all observations and only those 
greater than 0) and Exp_ben_in (for those farmers that never got an indemnity) grouped also by 
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variable Insurance00_03.  In the first rows, we report Exp_ben only for those farmers whose 
records indicate they receive an indemnity at least once in their insurance history  (n=33,291). 
For these, all Exp_ben  means are greater than 1, largest for those farmers with 
Insurace00_03=2 or Insurace00_03=3, and lowest for Insurace00_03=0. Medians are slightly 
above 1 for the frequent purchasers of insurance. The largest percentiles do not vary 
significantly across variable Insurace00_03=0.  In the second set of roles, we report Exp_ben 
for all farmers (n=52,334). This would be the source of information required to carry out 
actuarial studies, as it comprises both farmers that have received at least an indemnity and those 
that have not.  Means for Exp_ben range from 0.62 to 0.98, coinciding with those for farmers 
with Insurace00_03=0 and Insurace00_03=4, respectively.  Medians differ widely and reach 
0.7 for the most frequent insurance purchasers. The largest percentiles are similar among groups 
with different Insurace00_03 and similar to the farmers with a positive indemnity in their 
insurance history. In the last set of rows we report the inferred measures of insurance expected 
benefits, Exp_ben_in, for those farmers (n=20,043) including in the records that did not receive 
an indemnity in their entire insurance history.  All statistics of Exp_ben_in differ significantly to 
those just commented. Means and percentiles do not vary significantly across values of 
Insurace00_03, and medians are strikingy similar. The largest percentiles are much lower than 
those farmers with indemnities recorded in their insurance history. 
 The statistics reported in Table 2 seem to suggest that larger expected benefits from 
insurance, either actuar or inferred from the comarca, are associated with more frequent 
insurance purchasing. However, the evidence is dubious and poorly significant to discriminate 
among the intermediate levels of Insurace00_03. 
 The second and third variables, Varijt and Thirdijt, are by construction different from 0 for 
all farmers, irrespectively of their insurance experience. They are meant to provide a sense of 
the relative dispersion of the difference between collected indemnities and paid premiums. For 
this two variables we are assuming that, if the farmer did not purchase any policy in year t, an 
equivalent measurement of the dispersion of payoffs is provided by his comarca’s. Note also 
that, the inclusion of βt ensures that more weight is placed on the most recent years up to t 
ensures. This is the way we introduce a slight degree of memory in the construction of 
variances, in the same vein as Holt and Chavas (1990) did.  As these two variables are meant to 
provide an idea of the dispersion of the whole insurance experience of the farmer, they are 
evaluated taking into account the relative importance of each insured crop. Note, however, that 
Exp_benit (or Exp_ben_init, for that matter) and variables Varijt and Thirdijt provide a completely 
different description of the insurance experience of a farmer. While Exp_benit provides a pure 
return of the money spent in purchasing insurance,  Varijt and Thirdijt capture the relative 
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dispersion of the payoffs.  In Table 3 we report the statistics of Var for 2003 grouped by levels 
of Exp_ben.  While the largest mean (0.64) and median (0.68) are for the group with moderately 
large Exp_ben (between 1 and 2.5), the largest 95% percentiles and 99% percentiles belong to 
the group with the largest Exp_ben (>2.5). In sum, Table 3 shows that Var and Exp_ben are 
somewhat related (ρ=0.09 at p>0.01), but along a rather non-linear relationship. A final note 
about the different role of our two measures of expected revenue and dispersion of reports (Var 
and Third) refers to impact of premium subsidies. While our measures of insurance expected 
returns are highly sensitive to the level subsidies, Var and Third are so in a much lesser extent. 
This will allow us to infer likely changes in the probabilities of insurance participation levels 
caused by lower premium subsidies, focusing only on the coefficient of Exp_ben or Exp_ben_in 
of our insurance demand models.  
 
5. Insurance demand models 
 
Two approaches can be taken to estimate insurance demand models, each which its own variants 
and assumptions. In the first approach, we only look at the dichotomous choice of purchasing or 
not purchasing any insurance policy. In the second approach, we estimate a count  model of the 
number of years between 2000 and 2003 farmers purchased any insurance.  
 In the first case, we assume a farmer will purchase at least one insurance poliy in year t 
if: 
)'Pr()Pr( 00 11 >+== −− itttit XXInsur εβ                                   (7) 
where the explanatory variables Xt-1 are those defined in the previous section, which are entirely 
based on the farmer’s past insurance experience, and a set of dummies specific for each 
comarca. Variants of this model are estimated as a probit models3. The major difficulty of this 
approach is choosing the variable capturing the expected returns from insuring, namely, 
choosing an inferred or guessed variable or using the actual returns based on the farmer’s 
records. Having no a priori clue of what is appropriate, we base our choice on the econometric 
results, models’ predicting accuracy and goodness of fit.  
 Table 4 reports the results for three specifications (Exp_ben, Exp_ben_in, and Exp_ben 
using only farmers for whom Indikt≠0   for any t). The models are run for 2003, 2002 and for all 
observations including 2000-2003. The reason the 2003 runs have more observations than 2002 
                                                 
3 A comparison of logit and probit estimates was carried out, finding very similar coefficients and goodness 
of fits. Yet, based on better accuracy on Sensitivity and Specificity for Insur, probit models performed slightly 
better.  
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is because there are about 2,200 farmers that became insurers in 2003 for the first time. All runs 
have reasonable good sensitity and specificity indicators. These in turn are similar within the 
same models, indicating that both the 1s and the 0s are predicted with similar accuracy. Also, 
the monotonicity of the estimates for expected benefit, Var and Third is very consistent across 
models, in the sense that larger estimates of one coefficient are accompanied by larger estimates 
of the other two.   
 The estimates of coefficients for Var and Third do not vary significantly across models 
and time-periods. Farmers seem to respond positively to larger variances of loss ratios (Var) and 
negatively to larger absolute values of the third moment of the loss ratios (recall that Third is 
always negative). Interpreting this result is not straightforward, because Var and Third provide 
similar although slightly differerent measurements of dispersion of  loss ratios. What it seems to 
suggest is that the probability of purchasing insurance is greater when loss ratios exhibit greater 
variation, but are less negatively skewed around the expected loss ratio.  
 The most significant differences across models and time-periods come from the 
comparison of the coefficients of Exp_ben_in and Exp_ben, which range from 0.265 in the 
model with Exp_ben>0 (7th column in Table 4) to a minimum of 0.05 in the model with 
Exp_ben with 2002 data. This is partly due to the fact that both the median and the mean of 
Exp_ben are smaller in 2002 than in 2003, but also because with Ex_ben we include a large 
proportion of farmers that have never received an indemnity. The last three columns in Table 4 
report the largest coefficients for those farmers with Exp_ben>0. They are quite stable across 
periods, and jointly with the other coefficients, contribute to the best model’s fits. On average, 
they indicate that if a farmer’s past experience is associated with a loss ratio of 1, the probability 
of purchasing insurance is about 25%.  
 In table 5 we report the probit models for 2003 and the sample with Exp_ben>0, but the 
observations divided by the threshold of Exp_ben =1. In the first column, we report the probit 
regression results of those with 0<Exp_ben<1 (n=16,649), and in the second column we report 
those with Exp_ben>1 (n=15,542). The coefficients for the three key variables differ across 
samples, being significantly larger for those with loss ratios smaller than 1.  While one would 
expect that the coefficient of expected benefits is larger for the group with 0<Exp_ben<1, it is 
telling that those for Var and Third do also differ in such large extent considering the low 
correlation between Exp_ben and Var. This result is an indication that farmers respond to both 
the expected benefits from insurance as well as the dispersion of their loss ratios with respect to 
the loss ratios relevant to them. But it suggests that some farmers are willing trade-off some 
expected benefits from insurance in return for larger loss ratios’ dispersion. For those farmers 
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0<Exp_ben<1, with  this can only occur if indemnities are larger relative to liabilities but less 
frequent. 
 
 Insurance demand models can also be estimated as a count models, counting the number 
of years that a given farmer decides to purchase any type of insurance policy. This is what we do 
in our second approach. The dependent variable is Insurance00_03, which is evaluated in 2003 
and takes on values from 0 (no insurance purchased during 2000 and 2003) to 4 (insurance is 
purchased in all years during 2000-03). The model is estimated as a Zero-inflated model (ZIP)4, 
using the same explanatory variables used for the probit models. ZIP models are used when zero 
outcomes could arise out of two regimes. In our case, the fact that for some farmers 
Insurance00_03=0  is qualitative different from the case of Insurance00_03>0. In the first case 
insurance may not be purchased because the farmer simply retired or sold hos/her farm. In the 
second case, purchasing insurance may not always be a desirable risk management instrument 
because of low expected returns or inadequate indemnity regimes. ZIP model includes a binary 
probability model (logit or probit) that determines whether a zero or nonzero outcome occurs, 
and then in the second case a Poisson distribution describes the positive observations. Following 
the specification proposed by Greene (2000, p.890), let z dente a binary indicator of regime 1 
(z=0) or regime 2, and let y* denote the outcome of the poisson process of regime 2. If z is 
determined by a set of covariates Zit-1, the model is formulated as: 
 
)()Pr( γ11 −== iti ZFz                                                   (8) 
)(!
)Pr(
i
i
ej
e
zjy
j
i
ii µ
µµ
−−===
−
1
1 , with j=1,2,3,4                      (9) 
 
 Note that the covariates included in the first regime, (8), Zit-1 may be different from those 
of the second regime, Xit-1. ZIP models also differ from standard Poisson in that ZIP models do 
not impose that the mean and variance be equal (overdispersion), as Poisson model does. 
However, overdispersion may be caused by agents’ heterogeneity or by the regime splitting 
mechanism. In the first case, the true model is a Negative Binomial Regression Model 
(NBREG) and in the second case there may be a true regime splitting mechanism. Checking 
whether a NBREG process explains the data can be done with a Likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis of α=0, this parameter being the degree of overdispersion (Long and Freese, 2001). 
                                                 
4 Greene (2000) notes that this model has been coined in the literatura as ‘With Zeros’ (WZ), ‘Zero Inflated 
Poisson’ (ZIP) and ‘Zero-Altered Poisson’ (ZAP). 
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If H0 is not rejected then there is no overdispersion and the process is Poisson. As regard the 
other issue, whether or not overdispersion is due to a regime splitting mechanism, Voung (1989) 
proposed a test statistic for nonnested models, such as ZIP and Poisson. Since we rejected the 
presence of overdispersion caused by heterogeneity  (H0: α=0) for all specifications, the 
NBREG model was not used.  
 Voung test gave support of the ZIP model over the standard Poisson model (as shown in 
Table 6), indicanting that the zero-split regime seems to fit well with farmers’ records of 
Insurance00_03. For the regime 1 model we have used a probit specification with Exp_ben, Var 
and Third, ommitting comarca’s dummies5. The reason for including these three variables is due 
to the conjecture that they may also affect the decision of not purchasing insurance in none of 
the four years between 2000 and 2003.  
 The results of the ZIP model are thus reported in Table 6, together with the  median 
predictions for Insurance00_03 for year 2003. While we only report the coefficients for 
Exp_ben or Exp_ben_in, Var and Third, all regressions have been run including an intercept and 
the comarca’s dummies. All coefficients are highly significant and quite similar across 
regressions.  Signs, order  of magnitude and differences between Expected benefit, Var and 
Third follow the same pattern found with probit models reported in Tables 4 and 5. The ZIP 
model is thus a complementary approach to the probit models shown before. 
 Predicted values for the dependent variable Insurance00_03t are centered on the 
observed values, except for the cases where Insurance00_03t=1. In this case the prediction is 
biased towards 2, especially in the regression which includes only those Exp_ben>0 (third 
column). The models seem to predict better when Insurance00_03t>2, than if  
Insurance00_03t<2. 
 
The role of premium subsidies and changes in  the indemnities schemes 
 
The literature on insurance demand is clear about the effect of premium subsidies. If, as all 
available evidence overwhelmingly shows, farmers respond to the economic incentives that 
agricultural insurance policies provide, they would necessarily respond to changes in the 
premium subsidies.  Average premium subsidies range from 20-45% of the comercial premium, 
but the difference of expected benefits with subsidies and without subsidies is much smaller (for 
instance in Guadalentín Exp_ben average and median 0.49 and 0.09 with subsidies, and 0.42 and 
0.06 without subsidies). Variable Var is slightly smaller without subsides (average=0.47 & 
                                                 
5 The results for the regime 1 (probit) model are not reported in the paper, but can be obtained from the 
authors upon request.  
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median=0.42) than subsidies (average=0.56 & median 0.49). So with lower subsidies there 
would be a double disincentive to purchase insurance via lower expected revenue and lower 
variance. As the third moments are primarily driving by the asymmetry of the expected results, 
we do not expect them to change significantly as premium subsidies become lower.   
 Table 7 reports the point estimates for  Insurance00_03t for the three ZIP specification 
models  on Table 6. These estimates are evaluated for four values of expected benefits from 
insurance (0.375; 0.625; 0.875; 1.125), three values of Vart-1 (0.3; 0.45; 0.6), the comarca of 
Guadalmellato and the average value of Thirdt-1. The estimates for the remaining comarcas were 
not much different to merit a new table of point estimates. Results show that the impact of 
changes of Vart-1 is significantly larger than those of any measure of expected benefits. We find 
that a reduction of subsidies would add little to the demand for insurance, as long as Vart-1  is 
below 0.45 and expected benefits are below 0.625. For farmers with intermediate expected 
benefits (between 0.625 and 0.875), a strong reduction of subsidies (so that benefits fall by 0.25)  
would reduce insurance purchasing counts by a range of 0.02 and 0.4. When expected benefits 
are very high (1.125), a reduction of 0.25 points in expected benefits would reduce insurance 
counts by 0.02, if  Vart-1=0.3, and by 0.20,  if  Vart-1=0.6. These results indicate that farmers 
respond to premium subsidies, and the way their expected benefits from insurance are driven by 
the actual cost of premia, but they are significant more responsive to the variance of the 
expected benefits.  
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this study, we have analysed the demand for agriculture insurance using a new empirical 
approach that takes into account farmers’ insurance actual results. Using the complete records of 
all farmers of 7 Spanish comarcas with any insurance experience in 11 years, we computed three 
two alternative measures of individual expected benefits, variance and the third moment. Results 
show that farmers’ insurance uptaking are robustly explained by these three variables describing 
the observed economic returns from insurance and its variability are enough to explain insurance 
demand patterns found across widely different agricultural conditions. We hypothesize that 
farmers with insurance records who never collected an indemnity respond to a measure of 
expected benefit that is based on a weitghted average of loss ratios of his comarca and his crops.  
 We developed a two alternative demand models in order to include in the analyses the 
observations related to farmers that, even if they show evidence of being active insurees, they 
have never received an indemnity. Both binary models (probit) and count models (Zero-inflated 
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Poisson model) provide consistent results, and show evidence of farmers being responsive to our 
measures of the patterns of economic returns to agricultural insurance. Yet, all models and 
specifications show that the variability of returns (variance and third moment) have much more 
influence than the expected benefits. The main policy conclusion of these results is that 
premium subsidies play a minor role in comparison of the indemnities’ patterns. More dispersed 
indemnities patterns, in amount and frequency, are followed by more insurance participation. 
This implies that farmers purchase insurance primarily to seek insurance coverage from 
occasional and greater indemnities, and secondarily to get return from their insurance premia.  
 The analyses carried out here are just a small fraction of the issues that the database 
invites to look at. We have completely left out promising analyses of the farmers’ choice of 
coverage and more crop-specific insuring strategies.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Description of the study comarcas and insurance data 
 
Comarca’s Autonomous   
No. of 
farmers
Number of years between in which 
Insur=1 between 1993-2004 
Name Community Main insured crops  Mean perc25 Median perc50 perc95 
Mancha 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
Vineyards, Vegetables, 
Cereals 12846 5.69 2 5 9 12 
Campina Andalusia 
Cereals, Citrus, Cotton, 
Olive, Sunflower 5095 5.88 3 5 8 11 
Segria Catalonia 
Fruits, Cereals, 
Vineyards, cereals 6324 6.58 3 6 10 12 
Guadalentin Murcia 
Vegetables, Greenhouse 
crops, Grapes, Fruits 2112 4.81 2 4 7 11 
Campos Cast-Leon 
Cereals, Sugar Beet, 
Leguminosae 4323 6.69 4 6 10 12 
Albaida C. Valenciana 
Fruits, Grapes, Vineyard, 
Citrus, Vegetables 2677 6.22 3 5 9 12 
Jucar C. Valenciana Fruits, Citus, Vegetables 18957 6.26 4 6 9 12 
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Total   52334 6.10 3 6 9 12 
Source: ENESA  
 
 
Table 2. Reports of Exp_ben and Exp_ben_in for year 2003  
Exp_ben (only those with Exp_ben>0) 
 
Insurance00_03 N mean perc25% median perc75% perc95% perc99%
0  (No ins 2000-03) 7943 1.14 0.43 0.85 1.55 3.33 4.42 
1  (Once 2000-03) 1974 1.19 0.37 0.77 1.69 3.69 4.53 
2  (Twice 2000-03) 3181 1.39 0.47 1.00 2.02 3.91 4.77 
3  (Three 2000-03) 3356 1.39 0.50 1.08 1.99 3.85 4.66 
4  (All years 2000-03) 15837 1.28 0.51 1.02 1.79 3.33 4.42 
All observations 32291 1.26 0.47 0.96 1.77 3.50 4.51 
Exp_ben (all farmers including those with Exp_ben=0) 
 
 N mean perc25% median perc75% perc95% perc99%
0  (No ins 2000-03) 6626 0.83 0.41 0.75 1.18 1.53 2.19 
1  (Once 2000-03) 2390 0.84 0.39 0.76 1.18 1.72 2.23 
2  (Twice 2000-03) 3667 0.91 0.46 0.78 1.38 2.09 2.26 
3  (Three 2000-03) 2586 0.86 0.38 0.78 1.23 2.13 2.98 
4  (All years 2000-03) 4774 0.97 0.56 0.78 1.50 2.13 2.99 
All observations 20043 0.88 0.41 0.77 1.24 1.98 2.26 
Exp_ben_in (all including farmers) 
 
 N mean perc25% median perc75% perc95% perc99%
0  (No ins 2000-03) 14569 1.00 0.41 0.76 1.33 2.62 4.13 
1  (Once 2000-03) 4364 1.00 0.38 0.76 1.30 2.79 4.18 
2  (Twice 2000-03) 6848 1.14 0.47 0.83 1.45 3.13 4.43 
3  (Three 2000-03) 5942 1.16 0.42 0.83 1.50 3.30 4.48 
4  (All years 2000-03) 20611 1.21 0.52 0.94 1.57 3.10 4.30 
All observations 52334 1.12 0.45 0.84 1.49 3.02 4.31 
Source: ENESA  
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Table 3. Statistics of Var for all observations, based on Ex_ben for 2003 (all observations) 
Values of Exp_ben N mean perc25% median perc75% perc95% perc99% 
        Exp_ben = 0 20043 0.40 0.19 0.34 0.56 0.85 0.97 
0.5> Exp_ben > 0 8526 0.59 0.35 0.65 0.82 0.96 1.04 
1   > Exp_ben > 0.5 8123 0.61 0.33 0.68 0.87 1.01 1.11 
2.5> Exp_ben > 1 11407 0.64 0.33 0.68 0.94 1.15 1.35 
        Exp_ben > 2.5 4235 0.60 0.26 0.53 0.90 1.32 1.71 
Total 52334 0.53 0.24 0.51 0.80 1.05 1.26 
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Table 4. Probit models of insurance demand (dep variable Insurt) 
 Model Exp_ben (all) Model Ex_ben_in Model Exp_ben (only >0) 
 2003 2002 2000-03 2003 2002 2000-03 2003 2002 2000-03 
Exp_bent-1 0.126 0.050 0.059    0.265 0.237 0.231 
 0.007 0.007 0.003    0.009 0.010 0.005 
Exp_ben_in t-1    0.205 0.096 0.122    
    0.008 0.008 0.004    
Var t-1 6.174 5.569 5.529 6.713 5.838 5.845 7.641 7.270 7.333 
 0.113 0.109 0.056 0.116 0.112 0.056 0.137 0.137 0.070 
Third 3.373 2.813 2.905 3.813 3.040 3.169 4.398 3.912 4.061 
 0.101 0.097 0.049 0.103 0.099 0.050 0.116 0.114 0.058 
Campiña_dum 0.184 0.213 0.265 0.156 0.192 0.235 -0.174 -0.195 -0.070 
 0.024 0.024 0.012 0.024 0.024 0.012 0.037 0.038 0.019 
Segria_dum 0.147 0.230 0.239 0.071 0.191 0.183 0.076 0.123 0.204 
 0.022 0.023 0.011 0.023 0.023 0.012 0.027 0.029 0.014 
Guadalentin_dum -0.094 0.038 -0.020 -0.089 0.039 -0.020 -0.077 0.074 0.070 
 0.036 0.035 0.018 0.036 0.036 0.018 0.050 0.051 0.025 
Campos_dum 0.031 0.051 0.103 -0.020 0.028 0.074 -0.025 -0.009 0.030 
 0.017 0.018 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.023 0.025 0.013 
Albaida_dum 0.199 0.233 0.187 0.200 0.235 0.189 0.188 0.285 0.316 
 0.031 0.031 0.016 0.031 0.031 0.016 0.042 0.044 0.022 
Jucar_dum 0.787 0.787 0.796 0.729 0.772 0.773 0.792 0.695 0.764 
 0.018 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.020 -0.010 0.027 0.030 0.015 
Intercept -1.703 -1.668 -1.572 -1.843 -1.736 -1.660 -2.152 -2.283 -2.217 
 0.018 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.020 -0.010 0.027 0.030 0.015 
Sensitivity Pr( +| D)  0.798 0.811 0.792 0.80 0.812 0.7941 0.871 0.881 0.879 
Specificity Pr( -|~D)   0.745 0.720 0.705 0.75 0.7258 0.7063 0.716 0.726 0.718 
Positive predictive 
value Pr( D| +)    0.786 0.780 0.777 0.787 0.7838 0.7778 0.818 0.820 0.823 
Negative predictive 
value Pr(~D| -)   0.758 0.757 0.724 0.759 0.7593 0.726 0.791 0.811 0.799 
McFadden's R2 0.294 0.288 0.269 0.299 0.289 0.271 0.359 0.379 0.369 
No. Obs 52334 49917 195230 52334 49917 195230 32291 28830 111136 
All coeficients assymptotically significant at p>0.01 
Standard deviations reported in the cells below the coefficients 
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Table 5. Probit models of insurance demand (dep variable Insur) differentiating Exp_ben>1 and 
Exp_ben<1  
(year=2003) Only if Exp_ben t-1>0 & 
Exp_ben t-1<1 
Only if Exp_ben t-1>0 & 
Exp_ben t-1>1 
Exp_ben t-1 0.397 0.209 
 0.0459 0.0139 
Var t-1 10.08 7.00 
 0.316 0.193 
Third t-1 6.769 3.926 
 0.3104 0.162 
Sensitivity Pr( +| D)  0.866 0.88 
Specificity Pr( -|~D)   0.753 0.68 
Positive predictive value Pr( D| +)    0.814 0.83 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D| -)   0.82 0.76 
McFadden's R2 0.391 0.326 
n. Obs 16649 15642 
All coeficients assymptotically significant at p>0.01 
Standard deviations reported in the cells below the coefficients 
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Table 6. Zero-inflated regression models of insurance demand (Dependent Variable 
Insurance00_03 t)* 
 Exp_ben (all) Exp_ben_in (all)  Exp_ben>0 
Exp_ben t-1 0.0424  0.0603 
 0.003  0.004 
Exp_ben_in t-1  0.0712  
  0.004  
Var t-1 2.818 3.068 2.532 
 0.052 0.056 0.066 
Third 1.583 1.780 1.434 
 0.045 0.047 0.052 
Log likelihood -72702.9 -72613.8 -45229.1 
n.obs 52331 52331 32290 
Non-zero obs 37762 37762 24347 
Vuong Test 67.28 66.1 66.1 
Predictions Insurance00_03 median 
Insurance00_03=0 0.47 0.47 0.28 
 0.63 0.63 0.68 
Insurance00_03=1 1.53 1.57 2.07 
 0.84 0.83 0.91 
Insurance00_03=2 1.74 1.74 2.35 
 0.93 0.93 0.96 
Insurance00_03=3 2.59 2.59 2.96 
 0.89 0.90 0.88 
Insurance00_03=4 3.62 3.60 3.67 
 0.71 0.72 0.62 
*The coefficients of the comarca’s dummies and intercept are ommitted in the Table,  but used in the regression 
All coeficients assymptotically significant at p>0.01 
Standard deviations reported in the cells below the coefficients 
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Table 7. Point estimates of  predicted counts based on the expected returns of insurance and 
variance (Using ZIP models reported on Table 6 for Guadalentín, and average value of Thirdt-1)  
(year=2003)  Central values for expected benefits 
Equation Vart-1 0.375 0.625 0.875 1.125 
Exp_ben  0.3 0.9955 1.008 1.008 1.0335 
 0.45 1.85 1.87 2.16 2.215 
 0.6 2.5 2.505 2.945 3.07 
Exp_ben (only>0) 0.3 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.91 
 0.45 1.73 1.77 2.085 2.185 
 0.6 2.43 2.43 2.87 3.075 
Exp_ben_inf 0.3 0.85 0.91 0.91 1.03 
 0.45 1.74 1.8 2.13 2.24 
 0.6 2.465 2.465 2.925 3.135 
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Figure 1. Total agricultural insurance liability and ratios of Premium subsidies over liability in 
Spain (1992-2004) 
 
 
Source: ENESA (2005) 
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Figure 2. Histograms for Exp_ben (when >0) and Exp_ben_in (year 2003) based on 
Insurance00_03 
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